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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of implementing constrained Walrasian al-
locations for exchange economies with in¯nitely many commodities and ¯nitely
many agents. The mechanism we provide is a feasible and continuous mech-
anism whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with con-
strained Walrasian allocations. This mechanism allows not only preferences and
initial endowments but also coalition patterns to be privately observed, and it
works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies, and
thus it is a uni¯ed mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.
1 Introduction
This paper considers the problem of double implementation of constrained Walrasian
allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria using a feasible and continuous mech-
anism for pure exchange economies with in¯nitely many commodities and ¯nitely
many agents.
¤Financial support from the Texas Advanced Research Program as well as from the Private
Enterprise Research Center and the Lewis Faculty Fellowship at Texas A&MUniversity is gratefully
acknowledged.
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It is by now widely acknowledged that the ¯nite-dimensional setting is too re-
strictively modeled in many economic situations such as intertemporal decisions,
uncertainty, and di®erentiated commodities. In¯nite dimensional models have be-
come prominent in economics and ¯nance because they capture nature aspects of the
world that cannot be examined in ¯nite dimensional models. It has become clear
that economic models capable of addressing real policy questions must be both
stochastic and dynamic. A dynamic model requires in¯nite dimensional spaces. If
time is modeled as continuous, then time series of economic data reside in in¯nite di-
mensional functional spaces. Even if time is modeled as being discrete, we are forced
to use in¯nite dimensional models when we are to make realistic models of money
or growth. Other features of the world that arguably requires in¯nite dimensional
modeling are uncertainty and commodity di®erentiation.
Incentive mechanism theory in general and implementation theory in partic-
ular, however, have ignored the economic environment with in¯nite-dimensional
settings. There are numerous papers on implementation of (constrained) Walrasian
allocations in various solution concepts in implementation literature, including Hong
(1995), Hurwicz (1972, 1979), Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (1995), Nakamura
(1990), Peleg (1996), Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989), Schmeidler (1980), Suh
(1994), and Tian (1990, 1999, 2000). All the mechanisms mentioned above only
work with the ¯nite-dimensional economic environments, and there are no mech-
anisms given in the literature which implements Pareto and individually rational
allocations for economies with in¯nite-dimensional commodity spaces.
This paper gives a mechanism that Nash implements constrained Walrasian allo-
cations for exchange economies with an in¯nite-dimensional commodity space. The
commodity space we adopt are all the sequence spaces lp(1 5 p 5 1) and the
Lebesgue spaces Lp(1 5 p 5 1). Thus, we allow for commodity spaces which are
general enough to include most of the spaces used economic analysis. It will be
noted that our implementation result holds on a very large domain of economic
environments. Only the strict monotonicity condition is assumed. No continuity
and convexity assumptions on preferences are needed, and further, preferences may
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be nontotal or nontransitive. The mechanism is simple and natural. It is a type of
\market game" and thus it is similar to the Walras rule: the strategies of the mecha-
nism are \prices" and \quantities", and agents' consumptions are chosen from their
budget sets. The \natural" mechanism design provides at least a partial response
to a common concern about much of the implementation literature, namely that the
implementing mechanisms are highly unrealistic and impossible for a real player to
use. In addition, the mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also
for a two-agent world.
We should emphasize that the continuous and feasible mechanism design in the
in¯nite-dimensional setting di®ers in important ways from the continuous and fea-
sible mechanism design in the ¯nite-dimensional setting. There are mainly four
di±culties that arise in in¯nite-dimensional settings, but do not arise in ¯nite-
dimensional setting: (1) the feasible sets may not be compact; (2) there may not
exist a compact and convex subset of the positive cone of the dual space; and (3)
the wealth map may not be jointly continuous as a function of quantities and prices
so that the feasible correspondence may not continuous, and (4) the projection of a
point to a convex compact set may not be unique so that the feasible outcome func-
tion may not be single-valued. The ¯rst three di±culties are needed to be solved in
order to show the feasible correspondence is continuous so that the outcome function
obtained from the projection mapping to the feasible set is continuous. The fourth
di±culty should be solved for the outcome function to be a single-valued function.
To understand why these di±culties arise in the in¯nite-dimensional setting, we
discuss brie°y below these issues which distinguish a feasible and continuous mech-
anism design in the in¯nite-dimensional setting from the feasible and continuous
mechanism design in the ¯nite-dimensional setting, and the ways in which we deal
with them.
The ¯rst of these di±culties is that the feasible set may not generally be compact
in a given topology of the commodity space, in many cases, the best we can hope
for is that they will be compact in some weaker topology. In order to be sure that
optimization solutions exist, we will need to assume that such a weak topology does
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indeed exist and the feasible correspondence are suitably continuous in this weak
topology. These assumptions will be satis¯ ed for the class of in¯nite-dimensional
spaces we consider.
The second di±culty concerns the existence of a compact and convex subset
of the positive cone of the dual space. In the ¯nite-dimensional setting, the unit
simplex is convex and compact. In the in¯nite-dimensional setting, however, such
a compact and convex set may not exist. To be sure the existence of such a set
so that we can prove that the feasible correspondence is continuous, we adopt an
assumption introduced by Mas-Colell (1986) that, together with other assumptions
we make in the papers, can guarantee the existence of a convex and compact subset
of a positive cone.
The third di±culty is that the wealth map p cotx may not be jointly contin-
uous. We need this joint continuity of the wealth map to prove that the feasible
correspondence is continuous. In the ¯nite-dimensional setting, this map is jointly
continuous. In the in¯nite-dimensional setting, in order that the feasible correspon-
dence is compact-valued and there exist a convex and compact subset of positive
cone L¤+, we are led to consider a weak topology on the commodity space. Unfor-
tunately, as shown by Mas-Colell and Zame (1992), such a pair of choices may lead
to failure of joint continuity. Thus, we need to make sure that the wealth map is
jointly continuous for the commodity space under consideration.1
The fourth of these di±culties is about the single-valuedness of the feasible
outcome function. In the ¯nite-dimensional setting, the single-valued and feasible
outcome function can be obtained by a projection mapping from each proposed
allocation that may not be feasible to the feasible correspondence. In other words,
the outcome determined by the mechanism is the point in the feasible set that is
closest to the proposed allocation, i.e., which minimizes the distance between the
proposed outcome and any point in the feasible set for a given message. It is known
that such a projection in the ¯nite-dimensional setting is unique if and only if the
1The second and third di±culties do not arise, if the feasible sets have nonempty interior. In
such a case, one can easily prove the feasible correspondence is continuous.
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feasible set is closed and convex. Furthermore, the projection is continuous (cf
Mas-Colell (1985)). In the in¯nite-dimensional setting, however, the projection is
generally not unique. In order to be sure that single-valued projection exists, we
will need to assume the functional spaces are either the sequence spaces or Lebesgue
spaces. Fortunately, we can prove the projection is unique for either the sequence
spaces or Lebesgue spaces.2 In fact, as we will show, these four di±culties can
be solved with suitable choices of a compatible topologies for these two classes of
in¯nite-dimensional spaces.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents notions,
de¯nitions, and solution concepts which will be used in the paper. Section 3 presents
a speci¯c mechanism that is feasible and continuous. Section 4 proves the equiva-
lence among Nash allocations, strong Nash allocations, and constrained Walrasian
allocations and the mechanism doubly implements the constrained Walrasian cor-
respondence. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 Notation and De¯nitions
2.1 Economic Environments
To make this paper relatively self-contained, we begin with a brief review of the
basic properties of ordered normed spaces.
A normed space is a real vector space L equipped with a norm, i.e., a function
k ¢k : L ! [0; 1) such that kxk = 0 if and only if x = 0; k¸xk = j j¸kxk for all x 2 L
and ¸ 2 <; kx + yk 5 kxk + kyk for all x; y 2 L:
By the dual space of L we mean the space L¤ of continuous linear functionals
p : L ! <. As usual, if p 2 L¤, then value hx;pi will also be denoted by p ¢ x, i.e.,
hx;pi = p ¢ x. The dual space of L is also a normed space, when equipped with the
norm kpk = supfkp ¢ xk : x 2 L; kxk 5 1g.
In addition to the normed topologies, we shall be interested in several other
topologies on normed spaces. The weak topology on L, denoted by ¾(L; L¤), is the
2It seems this has only been proved for Hilbert space (cf. Gariepy and Ziemer (1995)).
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weakest topology with respect to which all the elements of L¤ are continuous. The
weak-star topology on L¤, denoted by ¾(L¤;L), is the weakest topology on L¤ with
respect to which all the elements of L are continuous.
A normed lattice (or called normed Riesz space) is a normed space L, together
with a partial order · on L (i.e., a re°exive, antisymmetric, transitive relation on L)
that satis¯es: x · y implies x + z · y + z for all x;y;z 2 L; x · y implies ¸x · ¸y
for all x; y 2 L and ¸ 2 <++; every pair of elements, x; y 2 L has a supremum (least
upper bound) x _ y and an in¯mum (greatest lower bound) x ^ y; jxj 5 jyj implies
kxk 5 kyk, where jxj is the absolute value of x that is de¯ned by jxj = x+ +x¡ with
x+ = x _ 0 (positive part of x) and x¡ = x ^ 0 (negative part of x). The notation
x ¸ y is, of course, equivalent to y · x. Also, x > y means x ¸ y and x 6= y. x is
positive if x ¸ 0 and x 6= 0. Denote by L+ = fa 2 L : 0 · ag the set of all positive
elements of L; L+ is referred to the positive cone. L+ may sometimes be called the
nonnegative cone.
In a Riesz pair hL;L0i, a positive vector x 2 L+ is strictly positive, written
x >> 0, if px > 0 for each 0 < p 2 L0. Denote by L++ = fa 2 L : 0 < ag
the set of all strictly positive elements L; L+ is referred to be the strictly positive
cone. A strictly positive vector is also called a quasi-interior point. An equivalent
characterization is that an element x 2 L is strictly positive if and only if the
sequence fkx ^ yg converges in norm to y as k tends to in¯nity for each y 2 L+.
Note that if the positive cone L+ of L has non-empty (norm) interior, then the set of
strictly positive elements coincides with the interior of L+. However, many Banach
lattices contains strictly positive elements even though the positive cone L+ has an
empty interior. For more information about normed spaces and normed lattices, we
refer to Aliprantis and Border (1994).
We formalize the notion of an economy in the usual way. Exchange economies
under consideration have a commodity space L that is the one either in the family
of Lp(S; §; ¹)-spaces or in the family of lp-spaces, where 1 5 p 5 1, S is the set of
states, § the set of a ¾-algebra of subsets of S, and ¹ a ¯nite and positive measure
de¯ned on § and Lp(S; §; ¹) is the class of all ¹-measurable functions f for which
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§ jf jpd¹ < 1 for 1 5 p < 1 and L1 is the space all ¹-measurable functions with
¯nite essential supremum in which the L1-norm is de¯ned kfk1 = ess supf =
supfjt : ¹(fx : jf(x)j = tg) > 0g. When time is modeled as a sequence of discrete
dates, one may use a space lp. For instance, space l1 plays a major role in the
neoclassical theory of growth and discreet-time dynamic macroeconomic models. If
there is an exhaustible resource in a setting, the l1 may be an appropriate setting
for the time series. When function spaces arise in models of uncertainty or time is
continuous, one may use a space Lp(S;§;¹).
For x; y 2 Lp, de¯ne x = y if x(s) = y(s) for ¹-almost all s 2 S. We can endow
Lp with the following partial order relation ·. We say x · y if x(s) 5 y(s) for
¹-almost all s 2 S. We say x < y if x · y and there exists a ¹nonnull subset E 2 S
such that x(s) < y(s) for ¹-almost all s 2 E. We say x << y if x(s) < y(s) for
¹-almost all s 2 S. Thus, the Lebesgue vector spaces Lp (1 5 p 5 1) with the
above de¯ned partial orders are clearly Banach lattices.
We assume that there are n agents in economies. Denote by N = f1;2; : : : ;ng
the set of agents. Each agent's characteristic is denoted by ei = (Pi; ºwi), where
Pi is the strict (irre°exive) preference de¯ned on L+ which may be nontotal or
nontransitive,3 and ºwi 2 L++ is the initial endowment of the agent. We assume
preference relation Pi is strictly monotonic in the sense that (xi + v0)Pixi for any
v0 2 L+ n f0g. To require well-behaved preferences that they admit supporting
prices, we assume that the canonical conjugate Ri of Pi is uniformly proper on the
order interval [0; ºw], where ºw =
Pn
i= ºwi.
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3If we de¯ne the binary relation Ri by a Ri b if and only if :b Pi a where : stands for \it is not
the case that", then Ri is the weak (re°exive) preference and is called the `canonical conjugate' of
Pi (see Kim and Richter (1986). If concepts used in this paper such as Nash equilibrium and the
constrained Walrasian allocations are interpreted in terms of the Ri, then the results obtained in
this paper for Pi are, in particular, valid for the Ri.
4The concept of properness was introduced by Mas-Colell (1986). The preference relation Ri
is said to be proper at x with respect to the total endowment ºw, if there is an open cone ¡x at
0, containing ºw, such that x ¡ ¡x does not intersects the preferred set fx0 2 L+ : x0Rixg, i.e., if
x0Rix, then x ¡ x0 62 ¡x. The interpretation is that the total endowment is desirable, in the sense
that loss of an amount ®ºw (® > 0) cannot be compensated for by an additional amount ®z of any
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An economy is the full vector e = (e1; : : : ; en) and the set of all such economies
is denoted by E.
It will not generally be true in the in¯nite dimensional setting that the feasible
consumption set is compact in the norm topology of the commodity space. To avoid
this di±culty, we should explicitly assume the existence of a Hausdor® vector space
topology ¿ such that the feasible consumption set is compact. Thus we have the
following notion.
A Hausdor® topology ¿ , on the Banach lattice L, will be called compatible if
(a) ¿ is weaker than the norm topology of L,
(b) ¿ is a vector space (i.e., the vector space operations on L are contin-
uous in the topology ¿),
(c) all order intervals [0; z] in L are ¿-compact.
The topology will vary according to the underlying Banach lattice L; it may be
the norm topology itself, or the weak topology, or the weak-star. For instance, if the
commodity space is the Lebesgue space Lp, 1 5 p < 1, the compatible topology
will be the weak topology. This follows from the fact that the Lebesgue space
Lp, 1 5 p < 1, are normed vector lattices with continuous norm, order intervals
are weakly compact (see Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1985, Theorem 12.9). If the
commodity space is L1 (l1), the compatible topology will be the weak¤ topology.
Recall that Alaoglu's theorem implies that order intervals are weak¤ compact (see
Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1985, Theorem 9.20)). Finally, if the commodity space
is the space of sequences lp, 1 5 p < 1, the compatible topology will be the
norm topology.5 This follows from the standard result that order intervals in lp,
1 5 p < 1, are norm compact.
commodity bundle z , if z is su±ciently small. The preference relation Pi is said to be uniformly
with respect to ºw on the order interval [0; ºw] if it is proper at every w 2 [0;ºw], and we can choose
the properness cone independently of w.
5If the commodity space is l1, the weak and norm topologies have the same compact set, so
there is certainly nothing to be gained by taking for ¿ the weak topology. This is one of the few
settings in which the feasible consumption will be norm compact.
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2.2 The Constrained Walrasian Allocations
By an allocation, we mean an n-tuple x := (x1; : : : ;xn) 2 Ln.
An allocation x 2 Ln is feasible if xi 2 L+ for all xi 2 L+, and
nX
i=1
xi 5
nX
i=1
ºwi;
An allocation x¤ = (x¤1; x¤2; : : : ; x¤n) 2 Ln is aWalrasian allocation for an economy
e if there is a price vector p¤ 2 L¤+ n f0g such that
(1) p¤ ¢ x¤i 5 p¤ ¢ ºwi for all i 2 N,
(2) for all i 2 N, there does not exist xi 2 L+ such that
(2.a) xi Pi x¤i ;
(2.b) p¤ ¢ xi 5 p¤ ¢ ºwi;
(3)
Pn
j=1 xj 5
Pn
j=1 ºwj .
The n +1-tuple (x¤1; : : : ; x¤n; p¤) is then called a Walrasian equilibrium. Denote by
W (e) the set of all Walrasian allocations.
An allocation x¤ = (x¤1; x¤2; : : : ; x¤n) 2 Ln is a constrained Walrasian allocation
for an economy e if there is a price vector p¤ 2 L+ n f0g such that
(1) p¤ ¢ x¤i 5 p¤ ¢ ºwi for all i 2 N,
(2) for all i 2 N, there does not exist xi 2 L+ such that
(2.a) xi Pi x¤i ;
(2.b) p¤ ¢ xi 5 p¤ ¢ ºwi;
(2.c) xi 5
Pn
j=1 ºwj ,
(3)
Pn
j=1 xj 5
Pn
j=1 ºwj .
The n +1-tuple (x¤1; : : : ;x¤n; p¤) is then called a constrained Walrasian equilibrium.
Denote by Wc(e) the set of all such allocations.
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Remark 1 From the above de¯nition, we can see that every ordinary Walrasian
allocation (competitive equilibrium allocation) is a constrained Walrasian allocation
and that a constrained Walrasian allocation di®ers from a Walrasian allocation only
in the way that each agent maximizes his preferences not only subject to his budget
constraint but also subject to total endowments available to the economy.
An allocation x is Pareto-e±cient with respect to strict preference pro¯le P =
(P1; : : : ; Pn) if it is feasible and there does not exist another feasible allocation x0
such that x0i Pi xi for all i 2 N.
An allocation x is individually rational with respect to P if : ºwi Pi xi for all
i 2 N.6
It can be easily shown that every constrained Walrasian allocation is Pareto-
e±cient and individually rational.7
An coalition C is a non-empty subset of N .
A group of agents (a coalition) C ½ N is said to block an allocation x if there
exists some allocation (x0; y0) such that
(i)
P
i2C x0i 5
P
i2C ºwi,
(ii) x0iPixi for all i 2 C .
A feasible allocation x is said to be in the core of e if there does not exist any
coalition C that can improve upon x.
Note that an allocation cannot be improved upon by N if and only if it is Pareto
e±cient, and an allocation cannot be improved upon by any single person if and
only if it is individually rational. Also every constrained Walrasian allocation is in
the core of e.
6This de¯nition coincides with the conventional de¯nition when Pi is the asymmetric part of a
re°exive, transitive, and total preference Ri.
7For weak preferences, Thomson (1985) showed that a constrained Walrasian allocation may
not be (regular) Pareto-e±cient (i.e., there is no way of making everyone at least well o® and one
person better o®) even if preferences satisfy local non-satiation. However, when preferences satisfy
strict monotonicity, it is (regular) Pareto-e±cient by Theorem 2.iv of Tian (1988).
10
2.3 Mechanism
Let F be a social choice rule, i.e., a correspondence from E to the commodity space
L. In the rest of the paper, we will use the constrained Walrasian correspondence
as a social choice rule.
Let Mi denote the i-th message (strategy) domain. Its elements are written as
mi and called messages. Let M =
Qn
i=1 Mi denote the message (strategy) space.
Let X : M ! L denote the outcome function, or more explicitly, Xi(m) is the i-th
agent's outcome at m. A mechanism consists of hM;Xi de¯ned on E. A message
m¤ = (m¤1; : : : ;m¤n) 2 M is a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the mechanism hM; hi for
an economy e if for any i 2 N and for all mi 2 Mi,
:Xi(m¤=mi; i) Pi Xi(m¤); (1)
where (m¤=mi; i) = (m¤1; : : : ;m¤i¡1; mi;m¤i+1; : : : ;m¤n). The outcome X(m¤) is then
called a Nash (equilibrium) allocation. Denote by VM;h(e) the set of all such Nash
equilibria and by NM;h(e) the set of all such Nash (equilibrium) allocations.
A mechanism hM;hi fully Nash-implements the constrained Walrasian corre-
spondence Wc on E if, for all e 2 E, NM;h(e) = Wc(e).
Remark 2 Note that the above de¯nition which was due to Hurwicz [5, p. 219]
allows the social choice correspondence Wc and the set ofNash equilibria to be empty
for the main purpose of this paper is to study the equivalence of the constrained
Walrasian correspondence and the set of Nash equilibrium allocations under the
minimal possible assumptions.8 A stronger de¯nition of full Nash-implementation
used in the literature is that not only NM;h(e) = F(e) but also NM;h(e) 6= ; for all
e 2 E. Thus, if we restrict the domain of Wc to the one on which Wc is nonempty-
valued, our results, to be presented below, will be equivalent for both de¯nitions.
A message m¤ = (m¤1; : : : ; m¤n) 2 M is said to be a strong Nash equilibrium of
the mechanism hM; hi for an economy e 2 E if there does not exist any coalition C
8Of course, if we impose more assumptions on preferences, by using the results such as in Zame
(1987), one can prove the existence of constrained Walrasian equilibria.
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and mC 2 Qi2CMi such that for all i 2 C ,
Xi(mC; m¤¡C) Pi Xi(m¤): (2)
X(m¤) is then called a strong Nash (equilibrium) allocation of the mechanism for
the economy e. Denote by SVM;X(e) the set of all such strong Nash equilibria and
by SNM;X(e) the set of all such strong Nash (equilibrium) allocations.
The mechanism hM; hi is said to doubly implement the constrained Walrasian
correspondence Wc on E, if, for all e 2 E, SNM;N(e) = NM;X(e) = Wc(e).
A mechanism hM;hi is individually feasible if X(m) 2 L+ for all m 2 M .
A mechanism hM;hi is weakly balanced if for all m 2 M
nX
j=1
Xj(m) 5
nX
j=1
ºwj: (3)
A mechanism hM;hi is feasible if it is individually feasible and weakly balanced.
Sometimes we say that an outcome function is individually feasible, balanced,
or continuous if the mechanism is individually feasible, balanced, or continuous.
3 A Feasible and Continuous Mechanism
In this section, we present a simple feasible and continuous mechanism which doubly
implements the constrained Walrasian correspondence on E. The mechanisms we
use in the paper is reminiscent from the those given in Tian (1992, 2000) in the
¯nite-dimensional context.
Let ¢ ½ L¤+ be a weak¤-compact and convex set such that p ¢ ºw = 1 for every
p 2 ¢. By Theorem 9.1 in Mas-Colell and Zame (1991), such a set exists.
For each i 2 N, let the message domain of agent i be of the form
Mi = (0; ºwi] £¢ £Ln; (4)
where (0; ºwi] = fwi 2 L+ : 0 << wi · ºwig. A generic element of Mi is mi =
(wi; pi;xi1; :::; xin) whose components have the following interpretations. The com-
ponent wi denotes a profession of agent i's endowment, the inequality 0 << wi 5 ºwi
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means that the agent cannot overstate his own endowment bundle; on the other
hand, the endowment can be understated, but the claimed endowment wi must be
strictly positive. The component pi is the price vector proposed by agent i and is
used as a price vector of agent i ¡ 1, where i ¡ 1 is read to be n when i = 1. The
component xij is interpreted as the trade that agent i is willing to make to agent j
(a negative xij means agent i wants to get ¡xij amount of goods from agent j).
De¯ne agent i's price vector pi : M ! ¢ by
pi(m) = pi+1; (5)
where n + 1 is to be read as 1. Note that although pi(¢) is a function of proposed
price vector announced by agent i+1, for simplicity, we can write p(¢) as a function
of m without loss of generality.
De¯ne a feasible correspondence B : M !! Ln+ by
B(m) = fx 2 Ln+ :
nX
i=1
xi 5
nX
i=1
wi &
pi(m) ¢ xi 5 11 + kpi¡ pi(m)kpi(m) ¢ wi 8 i 2 Ng; (6)
which is nonempty, convex, and ¿-compact for all m 2 M by the set is norm bounded
by the total endowments and ¿-closed. We will show the following lemma in the
Appendix.
Lemma 1 B(¢) is ¿-continuous on M .
Let ~xj =
Pn
i=1xij which is the sum of contributions that agents are willing to
make to agent j and ~x = (~x1; ~x2; :::; ~xn) .
The outcome function X: M ! Ln+ is given by
X(m) = fx 2 Ln+ : min
x2B(m) kx¡ ~xkg; (7)
which is the closest to ~x.
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 X(¢) is a single-valued continuous function.
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Proof. Since the distance function d(~x; y) = k~x ¡ yk is continuous in y, we know
that d will reach its maximum on B(m). Thus, X is a nonempty correspondence.
We want to show X is in fact a single-valued function on B. If ~x 2 B(m), then
d(~x;B(m)) = 0, and thus X(m) = ~x. So we only consider the case where ~x 62 B(m).
Suppose by way of contradiction that there are two points x1 and x2 in B(m)
such that kx1¡~xk = kx2¡ ~xk = d(~x;B(m)) for some m 2 M . Since B(m) is convex,
the convex combination x¸ = ¸x1 +(1 ¡¸)x2 2 B(m) with 0 < ¸ < 1, and thus, by
Minkowski's inequality, we have
kx¸¡~xk = k¸(x1¡~x)+(1¡¸)(x1¡~x)k 5 k¸(x1¡~x)k+k(1¡¸)(x1¡~x)k = d(~x;B(m)):
Thus, we must have
k¸(x1 ¡ ~x) + (1 ¡ ¸)(x2 ¡ ~x)k = k¸(x1 ¡ ~x)k + k(1 ¡¸)(x2 ¡ ~x)k
Notice that the Minkowski's inequality become equality if and only if there is
some t = 0 such that
¸(x1 ¡ ~x) = (1 ¡ ¸)t(x2 ¡ ~x):
Taking the norm on both sides and noting that k(x1 ¡ ~x)k = k(x2 ¡ ~x)k, we must
have
¸ = (1 ¡ ¸)t:
Consequently, we have
x1 ¡ ~x = x2 ¡ ~x
and therefore x1 = x2, a contradiction. Thus, X is single-valued.
Finally, since B(m) is a continuous correspondence, then, by Berge's Maximum
Theorem (Berge (1963)), we know X is a upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
However, since X is also single-valued, and thus it is a continuous function on B.
Also, since X(m) 2 Ln+ and
nX
i=1
Xi(m) 5
nX
i=1
ºwi (8)
for all m 2 M , the mechanism is feasible and continuous.
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Remark 3 Note that the above mechanism does not depend on the number of
agents. Thus it is a uni¯ed mechanism which works for two-agent economies as well
as for economies with three or more agents. For two-agent economies, only the fea-
sible and continuous mechanism which Nash implements the constrained Walrasian
correspondence was given by Nakamura (1990). Here we give an even simpler feasi-
ble and continuous mechanism which doubly implements the constrained Walrasian
correspondence not only for economies with a ¯nite dimensional consumption space
but also for economies with an in¯nite dimensional consumption space.
4 Results
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the proof of equivalence among Nash al-
locations, strong Nash allocations, and constrained Walrasian allocations. Proposi-
tion 1 below proves that every Nash allocation is a constrained Walrasian allocation.
Proposition 2 below proves that every constrained Walrasian allocation is a Nash
allocation. Proposition 3 below proves that every Nash equilibrium is a strong Nash
equilibrium. To show these results, we ¯rst prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 3 If m¤ 2 VM;X(e), then p¤1 = p¤2 = : : : = p¤n, and thus p1(m¤) = p2(m¤) =
: : : = pn(m¤) = p¤ for some p¤ 2 ¢.
Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that p¤i 6= p¤i+1 (i.e., p¤i 6= pi(m¤)) for
some i 2 N. Then pi(m¤) ¢ Xi(m¤) 5 11+kp¤i¡pi(m¤)kpi(m¤) ¢ w¤i < pi(m¤) ¢ w¤i , and
thus there is xi 2 L+ such that pi(m¤) ¢ xi 5 pi(m¤) ¢ w¤i and xi Pi Xi(m¤) by strict
monotonicity of preferences. Now if agent i chooses pi = pi(m¤), xii = xi¡Pt6=i x¤ti,
xij = ¡Pt6=i x¤tj for j 6= i, and keeps w¤i unchanged, then (0; : : : ;0;xi;0; : : : ;0) 2
B(mi;m¤¡i), and thus Xi(mi; m¤¡i) = xi. Therefore, Xi(mi; m¤¡i) Pi Xi(m¤). This
contradicts X(m¤) 2 NM;X(e). Thus we must have p¤1 = p¤2 = : : : = p¤n, and
therefore p1(m¤) = p2(m¤) = : : : = pn(m¤) = p¤ for some p¤ 2 ¢. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 If m¤ 2 NM;X(e), then w¤i = ºwi for all i 2 N.
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Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that w¤i 6= ºwi for some i 2 N. Then
pi(m¤) ¢ Xi(m¤) 5 pi(m¤) ¢ w¤i < pi(m¤) ¢ ºwi, and thus there is xi 2 L+ such that
pi(m¤)¢xi 5 pi(m¤)¢ºwi and xi Pi Xi(m¤) by strict monotonicity of preferences. Now
if agent i chooses wi = ºwi, xii = xi¡Pt 6=i x¤ti, xij = ¡Pt6=i x¤tj for j 6= i, and keeps
p¤i unchanged, then (0; : : : ; 0; xi;0; : : : ; 0) 2 B(mi;m¤¡i), and thus Xi(mi;m¤¡i) = xi.
Hence, Xi(mi;m¤¡i) Pi Xi(m¤). This contradicts X(m¤) 2 NM;X(e) and thus w¤i =
ºwi for all i 2 N. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 If X(m¤) 2 NM;X(e), then pi(m¤) ¢ Xi(m¤) = pi(m¤) ¢ ºwi.
Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that pi(m¤) ¢ Xi(m¤) < pi(m¤) ¢ ºwi
for some i 2 N . Then there is xi 2 L+ such that pi(m¤) ¢ xi 5 pi(m¤) ¢ ºwi
and xi Pi Xi(m¤) by strict monotonicity of preferences. Now if agent i chooses
xii = xi ¡ Pt6=i x¤ti, xij = ¡Pt6=i x¤tj for j 6= i, and keeps p¤i and w¤i unchanged,
then (0; : : : ;0;xi;0; : : : ;0) 2 B(mi; m¤¡i), and thus Xi(mi;m¤¡i) = xi. Hence,
Xi(mi; m¤¡i) Pi Xi(m¤). This contradicts X(m¤) 2 NM;X(e). Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 If the mechanism hM;Xi de¯ned above has a Nash equilibrium m¤
for e 2 E, then X(m¤) is a constrained Walrasian allocation with p¤ as a competitive
equilibrium price vector, i.e., NM;X(e) ½ Wc(e) for all e 2 E.
Proof. Let m¤ be a Nash equilibrium. Then X(m¤) is a Nash equilibrium
allocation. We wish to show that X(m¤) is a constrained Walrasian allocation. By
Lemmas 2 { 4, p1(m¤) = : : : = pn(m¤) = p¤ for some p¤ 2 ¢, w¤i = ºwi, and p(m¤) ¢
Xi(m¤) = p(m¤) ¢ ºwi for all i 2 N. Also, by the construction of the mechanism, we
know that X(m¤) 2 Ln+ and Pnj=1 Xj(m¤) 5 Pnj=1 ºwj . So we only need to show that
each individual is maximizing his/her preferences. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that for some agent i, there exists some ~xi 2 L+ such that ~xi 5 Pnj=1 ºwj , p(m¤)¢~xi 5
p(m¤) ¢ ºwi, and ~xi Pi Xi(m¤). Let xii = ~xi ¡ Pt6=i x¤ti, xij = ¡Pt 6=i x¤tj for j 6= i,
and keep p¤i and w¤i unchanged, then (0; : : : ;0; ~xi;0; : : : ; 0) 2 B(mi; m¤¡i), and thus
Xi(mi; m¤¡i) = ~xi. Therefore, we have Xi(mi; m¤¡i) Pi Xi(m¤). This contradicts
X(m¤) 2 NM;X(e). So X(m¤) is a constrained Walrasian allocation. Q.E.D.
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Proposition 2 If x¤ = (x¤1; x¤2; :::;x¤n) is a constrained Walrasian allocation with
a competitive equilibrium price vector p¤ 2 ¢ for e 2 E, then there exists a Nash
equilibrium m¤ of the mechanism hM; Xi de¯ned above such that Xi(m¤) = x¤i ,
pi(m¤) = p¤, for all i 2 N, i.e., Wc(e) ½ NM;X(e) for all e 2 E.
Proof. Since preferences satisfy the strict monotonicity condition and x¤ is a
constrained Walrasian allocation, we must have p¤ 2 ¢, Pnj=1 x¤j 5 Pnj=1 ºwj and
p¤ ¢ x¤i = p¤ ¢ ºwi for i 2 N. Now for each i 2 N, let m¤i = (p¤;x¤i1; :::; x¤in), where
x¤ii = x¤i and x¤ij = 0 for j 6= i.
Then x¤ is an outcome with p¤ as a price vector, i.e., Xi(m¤) = x¤i for all
i 2 N, and pi(m¤) = p¤. We show that m¤ yields this allocation as a Nash allo-
cation. In fact, agent i cannot change pi(m¤) by changing his proposed price (i.e.,
pi(mi;m¤¡i) = pi(m¤) for all mi 2 Mi). Announcing a di®erent message mi by agent
i may yield an allocation X(mi;m¤¡i) such that Xi(mi; m¤¡i) 2 L+ and
p(m¤) ¢ Xi(mi; m¤¡i) 5 p(m¤) ¢ ºwi: (9)
Now suppose, by way of contradiction, that m¤ is not a Nash equilibrium. Then
there are i 2 N and mi such that Xi(mi;m¤¡i) Pi Xi(m¤). Since Xi(mi; m¤¡i) 5Pn
i=1 ºwi, we must have, by the de¯nition of the constrained Walrasian allocation,
p(m¤) ¢ Xi(mi;m¤¡i) > p(m¤) ¢ ºwi. But this contradicts the budget constraint (9).
Thus we have shown that agent i cannot improve his/her utility by changing his/her
own message while the others' messages remain ¯xed for all i 2 N. Hence x¤ is a
Nash allocation. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 Every Nash equilibrium m¤ of the mechanism de¯ned above is a
strong Nash equilibrium, that is, NM;X(e) µ SNM;X(e).
Proof: Let m¤ be a Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 1, we know that X(m¤)
is a constrained Walrasian allocation with p(m¤) as a price vector. Then X(m¤) is
Pareto optimal and thus the coalition N cannot be improved upon by any m 2 M .
Now for any coalition C with ; 6= C 6= N, choose i 2 C such that i + 1 62 C . Then
no strategy played by C can change the budget set of i since pi(m) is determined
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by pi+1. Furthermore, because X(m¤) 2 Wc(e), it is the preference maximizing
consumption with respect to the budget set of i, and thus C cannot improve upon
X(m¤). Q.E.D.
Since every strong Nash equilibrium is clearly a Nash equilibrium, then by com-
bining Propositions 1-3, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For the class of exchange economies E, there exists a feasible and
continuous mechanism which doubly implements the constrained Walrasian corre-
spondence. That is, NM;X(e) = SNM;X(e) = Wc(e) for all e 2 E.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper gives a simple mechanism which doubly implements the constrained
Walrasian correspondence in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium for economies with
in¯nitely many commodities. In¯nite-dimensional commodity spaces arise naturally
when we consider economic activity over an in¯nite time horizon, or with uncertainty
about the possible in¯nite number of states of the world, or in a setting where an
in¯nite variety of commodity characteristics are possible. The mechanism we give
is feasible, continuous, and allows coalition patterns, preferences and endowments
to be unknown to the designer. Furthermore, preferences under consideration may
not be total, transitive, continuous, and convex preferences. In addition, unlike
most mechanisms proposed in the literature, it gives a uni¯ed mechanism which is
irrespective of the number of agents.
Though this paper only considers double implementation of the constrained Wal-
rasian correspondence for economies with in¯nite-dimensional spaces, one can simi-
larly consider implementation of other social choice rules such as Lindahl allocations
for economies with in¯nitely many commodities.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: First note that ¢ is weak¤ compact. Also, if xk ! x in
the norm topology of L, pk ! p in the weak¤ topology of L¤ and fpkg is order
bounded, pk ¢ xk ! p ¢ x [Yannelis and Zame (1986, Lemma A, p. 107)]. Then B(¢)
has closed graph by the continuity of pi(¢) and pi(¢) ¢ x. Since the range space of
the correspondence B(¢) is weakly bounded by the total endowments Pni=1 wi, it
is weakly compact. Thus, B(¢) is upper hemi-continuous on M . So we only need
to show that B(m) is also lower hemi-continuous at every m 2 M . Let m 2 M ,
x = (x1; : : : ;xn) 2 B(m), and let fmkg be a sequence such that mk ! m, where
mk = (mk1; : : : ;mkn) and mki = (w
k
i ; p
k
i ; z
k
i1; : : : ; z
k
in). We want to prove that there
is a sequence fxkg such that xk ! x, and, for all k, xk 2 B(mk), i.e., xk =
(x1k; : : : ; xnk) 2 Ln+, pi(mk) ¢ xik 5 11+kpki¡pi(mk )kpi(mk) ¢ w
k
i for all i 2 N, andP
i2N xik 5
P
i2N wki . We ¯rst prove that there is a sequence fx^kg such that
x^k ! x, and, for all k, x^k 2 Ln+ and pi(mk) ¢ x^ik 5 pi(mk)¢w
k
i
1+kpki¡pi(mk)k for all i 2 N . For
each i 2 N, two cases will be considered.
Case 1. pi(m)¢xi < pi(m)¢wi1+kpi¡pi (m)k . Hence, for all k larger than a certain integer k0,
we have pi(mk) ¢ xi < pi(mk)¢wki1+kpki¡pi(mk)k by noting that pi(¢) is continuous. Let x^ik = xi
for all k > k0 and x^ik = 0 for k 5 k0. Then, we have pi(mk) ¢ x^ik < pi (mk)¢wki1+kpki¡pi(mk)k.
Case 2. pi(m) ¢ xi = pi(m)¢wi1+kpi¡pi (m)k . Note that, since pi(m) > 0 and wi > 0 for all
i, we must have xi > 0. Let !i = pi(m)¢wi1+kpi¡pi(m)k and !ik =
pi(mk)¢wki
1+kpki ¡pi(mk)k. De¯ne x^ik
as follows:
x^ik =
8<: !ikpi(mk)¢xixi if !ikpi (mk)¢xi 5 1xi otherwise :
Then x^ik 5 xi, and pi(mk)¢ x^ik 5 pi(mk)¢wki1+kpki ¡pi(mk)k. Also, since
!ik
pi(mk)¢xi ! !ipi(m)¢xi = 1,
we have x^ik ! xi. Thus, in both cases, there is a sequence fx^kg such that x^k ! x,
and, for all k, x^k 2 Ln+ and pi(mk) ¢ x^ik 5 pi (mk)¢w
k
i
1+kpki¡pi(mk)k for all i 2 N.
We now show that there is a sequence f¹xkg such that ¹xk ! x, and, for all k,
¹xk 2 L+ and Pi2N ¹xik 5 Pi2N wki .
We ¯rst show this for the sequence spaces lp. There are two cases will be con-
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sidered for each component of vector x = (x1;x2; : : : ;xt; : : :) with 1 5 t < 1.
Case 1.
P
i2N xti <
P
i2N wti. Hence, for all k larger than a certain integer k0, we
have
P
i2N xti <
P
i2N wtki . For each i 2 N, let ¹xtik = xti for all k > k0 and x^tik = 0
for k 5 k0. Then, we have Pi2N xtik < Pi2N wtki .
Case 2.
P
i2N xti =
P
i2N wti. Note that, since wi > 0 for all i, we must haveP
i2N xti > 0. For each i 2 N, de¯ne ¹xtik as follows:
¹xtik =
8<:
P
i2N wtkiP
i2N xti
xi if
P
i2N wtkiP
i2N xti
5 1
xti otherwise
:
Then x^tik 5 xti, and
P
i2N ¹xtik 5
P
i2N wtki . Also, since
P
i2N wtkiP
i2N xti
!
P
i2N wtkiP
i2N xti
= 1,
we have x^tik ! xti. Thus, in both cases, there is a sequence fx^kg such that x^k ! x,
and, for all k, x^k 2 L+ and Pi2N xki 5 Pi2N wki . Here x^k = (x^1k; x^2k; : : :).
Similarly, we can show this for the Lebesgue spaces Lp by considering two cases:
(1)
P
i2N xi(s) <
P
i2N wi(s) and (2)
P
i2N xi(s) =
P
i2N wi(s) for each s 2 S.
Finally, let x0k = min(¹xk; x^k) with x0ik = min(¹xik; x^ik) for i = 1; : : : ; n. Then
x0k ! x since ¹xk ! x and x^k ! x. Also, for every k larger than a certain integer ¹k,
we have x0k ¸ 0,
P
i2N x0ik 5
P
i2N wki because x0k 5 ¹xk and
P
i2N ¹xik 5
P
i2N wki ,
and pi(mk) ¢ x0ik 5 pi(mk)¢w
k
i
1+kpki ¡pi(mk)k for all i 2 N by noting that x
0
ik 5 x^ik. Let xk = x0k
for all k > ¹k and xk = 0 for k 5 ¹k. Then, xk ! x, and xk 2 B(mk) for all
k. Therefore, the sequence fxkg has all the desired properties. So Bx(m) is lower
hemi-continuous at every m 2 M . Q.E.D.
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